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Announced by President Xi Jinping in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has gradually come to assume the status as China’s flagship global development strategy. While Beijing stresses the peaceful 
developmentalist dimension of the initiative, analysts have alluded to the 
potential geopolitical agenda behind this multi-sectoral effort that has been 
expanded to China’s grand periphery, including vast parts of Latin America, 
the Middle East and Africa.1 As Chinese capital increasingly penetrates 
markets in the Global South, policy makers in Beijing have realised the need 
to ensure security of Chinese citizens and entities abroad. In the meantime, 
China has become a leading international arms exporter. Data from the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) suggests that 
Chinese defence companies are among the largest globally, making China 
the second-largest arms producer behind the United States and ahead 
of Russia.2 These structural changes are driven by two simultaneous 
processes: (a) an increase in demand from countries along the BRI, 
particularly in the Middle East and Africa, which endeavour to modernise 
their defence capabilities; and (b) changes in supply, as Chinese companies 
are increasingly exporting high technology weapons systems abroad.3 One 
noticeable trend relates to the export of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).4 
As will become evident, UAVs have been part of an attempt to develop 
and consolidate diplomatic relationships with recipient states, resulting 
in a strategic disadvantage for established Western players, including the 
United States.5 
This Strategic Update investigates the diplomatic and security implications 
of China’s outward expanding defence industry by focusing particularly on 
the case of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), which can be used 
for military and security purposes. This gives insight into the implications 
of China’s modernising defence industrial base for international arms 
transfers and security along the BRI, a topic of immense future relevance. 
The latest SIPRI data was triangulated with expert opinions and available 
literature.6 The first section contextualises a more outward facing Chinese 
defence industry amidst the BRI and growing bilateral security engagement. 
It reflects on the geopolitical significance of these developments in 
the context of China-US competition. The second section focuses on 
operationalisation and explains the security implications and reliability 
issues of Chinese equipment. 
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BRI member & Recipient 
of Chinese Drones7 BRI member # of Drones
Algeria Yes 10
Egypt Yes 60
Indonesia Yes 8
Iraq Yes 12
Jordan Yes 6
Kazakhstan Yes 3
Myanmar Yes 12
Nigeria Yes 5
Pakistan Yes 25
Saudi Arabia Yes 70
Sudan Yes 10
Turkmenistan Yes 4
UAE Yes 40
Unknown Recipient N/A 2
Uzbekistan Yes 5
As becomes evident from the visualisation on the opposite page, export patterns of Chinese 
UCAVs reflect a turn towards the Middle East and Africa. These developments should be 
interpreted against the evolution of the Chinese defence industry and policy changes under 
President Xi Jinping. China’s defence industry has been affected by the general drive towards 
market reforms in China since 1978, characterised by selective policy decentralisation 
and sectoral consolidation. Nonetheless, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) remain 
central players and exports are reportedly key for the profitability of the sector.8 Three SOEs 
are central actors in the production and export of UCAVs: 
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Table showing relevant SOEs.9
  
Company  Primary military goods and services
 
Aviation Industry Corporation 
of China (AVIC) 
 
Aircraft and avionics
 
China Aerospace Science and Industry 
Corporation (CASIC) 
 
Missiles and space systems 
 
China Aerospace Science and Technology 
Corporation (CASC) 
 
Missiles, space systems and 
unmanned aerial vehicles
The pursuit of high-tech defence equipment 
connects to the modernisation of China’s 
defence-industrial base and the desire to 
achieve a competitive advantage in the UAV 
industry. It helps achieve the goals outlined 
in the Chinese industrial strategy, Made 
in China 2025, which aims to shift China’s 
economic output value and become a world 
leader in high-tech manufacturing. UAV’s are 
further a focus area in the State Council’s 
2017 “Next Generation Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) Development Plan”.10 This exemplifies 
the close connection between national and 
international commercial and political aims 
in the evolution of China’s defence industrial 
base: a clear demand in Africa and the 
Middle East strengthens China’s domestic 
UAV industries, whilst securing economic 
and political dividends from these sales as 
will become evident below.
In China, the lines between state-
involvement and commercial incentive are 
often blurred, as shown through an analysis 
of CASC’s relationship to the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). CASC is one of 
the largest drone manufacturing SOEs that 
have seen a growing demand for their UCAV 
exports. In line with their corporate purpose 
of giving priority to “…national interests, 
to be human-oriented, to win credit with 
quality, to get stronger through innovation”, 
CASC has close political relations to the 
highest echelons of Chinese leadership.11 
Throughout the operating history of CASC, 
there has been much commendation from 
the highest echelons of CCP leadership, 
including former General Secretary Hu 
Jintao. Dating back to 1999, successive 
CCP leaders have openly embraced the role 
that CASC plays in expanding China’s power 
and dreams in the aerospace industry.12 
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Beijing has started to 
foster defence and security 
relationships in Africa and 
the Middle East. The key 
drivers of this engagement 
relate to Beijing’s interests 
to protect Chinese citizens 
and overseas investments in 
potentially volatile markets, 
and potentially consolidate 
diplomatic relationships.
‘‘
‘‘
The rise of Ma Xingru, promoted to General 
Manager of CASC in September 2007 and 
elevated to the 18th CCP Central Committee 
in 2012, is indicative of the industry’s 
strategic importance.13 Xingrui’s successor, 
Wu Yangsheng has previously argued for 
greater military-civilian integration, a focus 
area of military and defence reform under 
Xi Jinping.
The connection to China’s defence 
modernisation is consequently not far off. Xi 
Jinping himself argued in 2016 that UAVs are 
key actors in modern battlefields.14 China’s 
2019 Defence White Paper thus outlines “…
the prevailing trend to develop long-range 
precision, intelligent, stealthy or unmanned 
weaponry and equipment” and puts it in 
the context of the evolution towards “…
informationised warfare…”.15 In line with this 
in October 2019, UCAVs were a highlight at 
the National Day parade in celebration of the 
70th anniversary of the PRC’s founding.16 
Domestically, Chinese authorities have used 
UAVs for a range of purposes. UAVs from 
CASC conducted surveillance missions as 
part of alleged anti-terrorism campaigns 
in Xinjiang.17 During the recent COVID-19 
outbreak in Wuhan, drones delivered 
medical samples and quarantine materials 
to hospitals and patients within the city.18 
They were further used to enforce quarantine 
measures, although crowd-management 
through UAVs is in its infancy and faces 
regulatory hurdles.19 
Internationally, the above developments 
coincide with foreign policy and diplomatic 
objectives under Xi Jinping in the context of 
growing engagement in security relationships 
and the expansion of the BRI and People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) activities. Working 
within a more nuanced interpretation 
of the principle of non-interference, 
a cornerstone of China’s diplomacy, 
Beijing has started to foster defence 
and security relationships in Africa and 
the Middle East. The key drivers of this 
engagement relate to Beijing’s interests 
to protect Chinese citizens and overseas 
investments in potentially volatile 
markets, and potentially consolidate 
diplomatic relationships. The events 
in the table on the next page illustrate 
how overseas experiences have shaped 
Beijing’s awareness and perception of 
risk, coinciding with policy changes 
that manifest a more active defence 
diplomacy. Evacuation missions in Libya 
and Yemen, and experiences of risk to 
Chinese nationals and investments in 
South Sudan and Mali epitomise the need 
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to mitigate security challenges along the 
BRI. The emphasis on closer cooperation 
in security and defence matters is reflected 
in the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC). Security was formally introduced 
in 2012 and gradually expanded since then. 
The 2018-2021 FOCAC Action Plan outlines 
scope for security cooperation along the 
BRI, including intelligence and technology 
sharing, and capacity building of local 
security personnel to safeguard Chinese 
investments and citizens. 50 security 
assistance programs were announced 
alongside a pledge to strengthen defence 
and military cooperation and training.20 The 
ensuing China-Africa Defence and Security 
Forum in 201821 and Peace and Security 
Forum in 201922 took place in Beijing and 
invited defence ministers and officials from 
all over Africa to discuss the deepening of 
cooperation in these areas. 
These initiatives reflect a more concerted 
peripheral diplomacy under Xi Jinping. 
Diplomatic visits of senior PLA officials to 
neighboring countries even before the 2013 
and 2014 fora emphasised the importance 
of creating stability. This included Vietnam, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Philippines, the DPRK, Pakistan, and India.23 
As evident in the export data above, these 
political motivations coincide with the 
increase in UAV transfers. More assertive 
diplomacy under Xi Jinping has enabled 
a more outward facing Chinese defence 
industry, yielding a growing willingness 
in Beijing to foster defence and security 
cooperation along the BRI. This suggests 
that commercial incentives and political-
diplomatic rewards are not necessarily 
opposed to each other, as the following 
examples highlight.
Overview of key events. 
Overseas Evacuations The Chinese government evacuated approximately 
36,000 Chinese citizens amidst civil unrest from Libya in 
201124 and several hundred citizens from Yemen in 201525 
FOCAC 2012 Security formalised as part of the 
China-Africa relationship
Work Forum on Peripheral 
Diplomacy 2013 and the 
Central Conference on 
Foreign Affairs 2014
New type of peripheral diplomacy under Xi Jinping 
expanding diplomatic activities towards the West
FOCAC 2018 Security umbrella broadened, defence 
cooperation consolidated 
Defence and Security 
Forum 2018 and Peace and 
Security Forum 2019
Defence cooperation between China 
and Africa is institutionalised
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Commercial Opportunities, Political Dividends
 
Overview of UCAVs, respective SOEs that manufacture them, specifications.26
UCAV Model Year  
Devel-
oped
Recipient (amount  
ordered and year ordered)
Company          Description
CH-1 (Chang 
Hong-1) 
2010 Unknown Recipient  
(2, 2003)
CASC  ■ Max altitude: 3,000 meters
 ■ Max payload: 4.5kg 
 ■ Max range: 740 km
CH-3 (Chang 
Hong-3) 
2012 Algeria (5, 2017)  
Myanmar (12, 2013),  
Nigeria (5, 2014),  
Pakistan (5, 2015),  
Sudan (5, 2014) &  
Turkmenistan (2, 2015)
CASC  ■ Max altitude: 4,000 meters
 ■ Max payload: 180kg
 ■ Max range: 960km
CH-4 (Chang 
Hong-4) 
2014 Algeria (5, 2017),  
Indonesia (8, 2017),  
Iraq (12, 2014),  
Jordan (6, 2015),  
Saudi Arabia (5, 2014) & 
Sudan (5, 2015)
CASC  ■ Max altitude: 5,000 meters
 ■ Max payload: 345kg
 ■ Max range: 5000 km
CH-5 (Chang 
Hong-5)
2015 None to date CASC  ■ Max altitude: 7,000m
 ■ Max payload: 1,200 kg
 ■ Max range: 2000km
ASN 209 2012 Egypt (18, 2010) CASIC  ■ Max altitude: 5,000 meters
 ■ Max payload: 50 kg 
 ■ Max range: 200 km
WJ-600 2010s Turkmenistan (2, 2015) CASIC  ■ Max altitude: 10,000 meters
 ■ Max payload: 600 kg 
 ■ Max range: 2,100 km
Wing 
Loong-1 
2011 Egypt (10, 2016),  
Kazakhstan (3, 2015), 
Pakistan (5, 2015), 
Saudi Arabia (15, 2014), 
UAE (25, 2011) &  
Uzbekistan (5, 2013)
AVIC  ■ Max altitude: 8,000 meters
 ■ Max payload: 200 kg 
 ■ Max range: 4,000 km
Wing 
Loong-2 
2017 Egypt (32, 2018),  
Saudi Arabia (50, 2017) 
& UAE (15, 2017)
AVIC  ■ Max altitude: 9,900 meters
 ■ Max payload: 400 kg 
 ■ Max range: 1,500 km
LSE IDEAS Strategic Update  |  May 202010
In comparison to other major drone-
producing countries, namely the United 
States, Israel and Russia, Chinese drones 
are generally slower, fly at lower altitudes 
and deliver a lower payload than their 
competitors.  However, they fly almost 
twice as long and are much cheaper. For 
instance, the CH-5 costs half as much as 
the American MQ-9 Reaper and the CH-4 
can go for even lower: 75% of the American 
MQ-9.27 There have been reliability issues 
with earlier models of Chinese UCAVs. For 
instance, in 2016, the Jordanian Royal Air 
Force (JRAF) acquired six CH-4B drones. 
Three years later in July 2019, the JRAF 
put all six up for sale, citing “performance” 
issues.28 Earlier, Algeria had decided not to 
purchase the CH-4, given that two of the 
drones crashed during evaluation flights in 
2013 and 2014. Furthermore, according to a 
recent US government report, Iraq only has 
one operational CH-4B drone out of a fleet 
of “more than 10”.29  However, UCAVs such 
as the Wing Loong-II, developed in 2017, and 
the CH-5, developed in 2018, demonstrate 
growing technological sophistication while 
maintaining a favourable price tag for 
foreign militaries.30
Case Study: CASC & Saudi Arabia
The precise connections between 
commercial actors (SOEs), their activities 
abroad, and Beijing’s foreign policy goals 
remain difficult to pin down. Analysts note 
that the export of arms requires official 
approval, that the state may support SOEs 
in securing contracts abroad, and that 
arms may be part of bilateral security 
assistance.31 A case-by-case approach 
nonetheless reveals the central position 
of defence SOEs and UCAVs exports in 
the consolidating diplomatic relationships 
and economic interests along the BRI. 
In order to overcome limitations of the 
principle of non-interference and mitigate 
potential security challenges outlined 
above, China has engaged in capacity 
building in security sectors along the BRI.32 
Such defence-industrial cooperation aims 
to enhance recipient countries’ defence 
capabilities through arms transfers and 
training, combining commercial and political 
objectives.33 It meets the rising demand 
from countries that want to modernise 
their defence capabilities, particularly 
in the intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance aircraft sector.34 
For instance, CASC produces the CH-4 
UCAV in a factory opened in Saudi Arabia. 
The factory is part of a larger package deal 
signed in Beijing during a meeting between 
Xi Jinping and Saudi Arabia’s King Salman. 
The deal, which was reportedly concluded 
at the International Defence Exhibition 
and Conference in Abu Dhabi in February 
2017, is believed to have involved the state-
owned Saudi Technology Development 
and Investment Company (TAQNIA) and 
China’s state-owned Aerospace Long-March 
International Trade (ALIT), which exports 
defence and anti-terrorism equipment and 
is a subsidiary of CASC.35 It also formed 
part of a broader agreement, with the two 
countries deciding to develop oil refineries 
and co-operate on China’s Chang E-4 
moon mission.36 The export of UCAVs thus 
reflects the coming together of commercial 
opportunism and diplomatic dividends. 
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This contributes to the perception of the growing 
geopolitical competition in defence cooperation 
and exports. The above affirms that UCAV exports 
represent a broader effort to fill the void of arms 
sales left by alternative suppliers such as the United 
States. Despite being important US trading partners, 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt have given preference to the 
cheaper and more readily available Chinese UCAVs—
as the CH-4 can cost 75% less than the American MQ-9 
Reaper drone, providing cash-strapped countries a 
more attractive option to upgrade their arsenal. Saudi 
Arabia has imported 70 Chinese UCAVs compared to 
none from the U.S., and Egypt has imported 60 Chinese 
UCAVs since 2010, compared to 112 U.S. drones, the 
last of which was ordered in 1985. The UAE is the sole 
exception to this UCAV export trend, having imported 
ten American RQ-1 Predator drones in 2017. 
In addition to offering more preferable prices, Beijing 
also benefits from skirting the international regulations 
that restrict Washington’s ability to compete. One such 
obstacle for the US is the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR), established in 1987, which aims 
to limit the proliferation of missiles that are able to 
carry WMDs—including UCAVs, as they can carry such 
equipment and have a range of over 300km.37 However, 
Beijing is not party to it. Having recognised the 
serious challenge the treaty poses for strengthening 
partnerships and holding off China’s military advance, 
in 2018 the Trump administration announced a new 
policy intended to loosen export restrictions on armed 
drones.38 However, there has been little evidence 
so far that this will succeed in reversing the China-
oriented trends.39
UCAV exports 
represent a broader 
effort to fill the 
void of arms sales 
left by alternative 
suppliers such as 
the United States.
‘‘
‘‘
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Influencing the Battlefield
Lastly, the proliferation of Chinese UCAVs is starting to have an 
impact on battlefields in the Middle East and Africa. Reports 
have shown that the Nigerian Air Force has utilised the armed 
CH-3 drone, which has been in their inventory at least since 
2014, against insurgent groups. In February 2016, the Nigerian 
Air Force reportedly used the CH-3 drone in order to destroy a 
Boko Haram logistics base in Sambisa forest.40 In April 2018, the 
Saudi military fired a Chinese Blue Arrow-7 laser-guided missile 
from a Wing Loong-II UCAV to assassinate Houthi rebel leader 
Saleh Ali al-Sammad.41 Egypt has also used Wing Loong-IIs to 
fight against militants in northern Sinai.42 Chinese UCAVs are 
thus beginning to have an impact on Middle Eastern and African 
security sectors. 
Overall, the growing exports of Chinese UAVs should be 
interpreted in the wider context of domestic and diplomatic 
developments over the last decade. SOEs are central players in 
China’s industrial policy and domestic defence modernisation. 
In the context of the two windows of opportunity outlined 
here, the commercial interests of China’s SOEs and their 
expansion along the BRI coincide with growing diplomatic and 
security cooperation on the part of the Chinese government. 
The combination of both trade and investment provides ample 
rationale for providing drones in addition to other weaponry – all 
with increased ties to the Chinese military and defence industry.43 
Seen in the context of Xi Jinping’s goal to consolidate China’s 
position internationally, this helps to bolster China’s image with 
all the necessary great power credentials. In the larger context 
of geopolitical competition between China and the US, UCAVs 
thus symbolise the potential strategic dividend of defence 
cooperation and arms transfers along the BRI: a significant trend 
that analysts should not neglect.  
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